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Task Game Theory
Content: теория игр.docx 18,51 kB
Product description
The two firms have one job. Firm i (i is equal to 1.2)
It offers paid wi, where 0 <1 / 2w1 <w2 <2w1 and w1> = w2. Two workers looking for work, and each of them can be accessed only from aquatic firms. Working at the same time decide to apply to the company or firm 1 2. If only one of the workers goes to a company, then the worker gets this place (and its winnings will be equal to the salary); If both refer to the same company, the firm randomly selects one of them (with probability 1/2) and the other is working without work (and retrieves the winning zero).
1. Locate the normal form of the game described.
2. Find the Nash equilibrium of this game.
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